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The diplomats and decisionmakers of the United States believe, habitually and uncritically, that stability abroad is our
most important strategic objective. They may insist, with fragile sincerity, that democracy and human rights are our
international priorities--although our policymakers do not seem to understand the requirements of the first and refuse
to meet the requirements of the second. The United States will go to war over economic threats, as in Desert Storm. At
present, we are preoccupied with a crusade against terrorism, which is as worthy as it is difficult. But the consistent,
pervasive goal of Washington's foreign policy is stability. America's finest values are sacrificed to keep bad
governments in place, dysfunctional borders intact, and oppressed human beings well-behaved. In one of the greatest
acts of self-betrayal in history, the nation that long was the catalyst of global change and which remains the beneficiary
of international upheaval has made stability its diplomatic god.
Our insistence on stability above all stands against the tides of history, and that is always a losing proposition.
Nonetheless, our efforts might be understandable were they in our national interest. But they are not. Historically,
instability abroad has been to America's advantage, bringing us enhanced prestige and influence, safe-haven-seeking
investment, a peerless national currency, and flows of refugees that have proven to be rivers of diamonds (imagine
how much poorer our lives would be, in virtually every regard, had our nation not been enriched by refugees from
Europe's disturbances in the last century).
Without the instability of the declining 18th century, as the old European order decayed, we would not have gained the
French assistance decisive to our struggle for independence. Without the instability of the 20th century, protectionist
imperial regimes might have lingered on to stymie our economic expansion. And without the turbulence that seeks to
rebalance the world today, much of humanity would continue to rot under the corrupt, oppressive regimes that are
falling everywhere, from the Balkans to Southeast Asia. A free world subject to popular decision is impossible without
the dismantling of the obsolete governments we rush to defend. In one of history's bitterest ironies, the United States
finally became, in the 1990s, the reactionary power leftists painted us during the Cold War.
Before examining in greater detail why instability abroad is often to America's long-term benefit, let us consider the
foolish manner in which we have descended from being a nation that championed change and human freedom to one
that squanders its wealth, power, and lives in defense of a very bad status quo.

We began well enough, applauding Latin America's struggles to liberate itself from the grip of degenerate European
empires (except, of course, in the case of Haiti, whose dark-skinned freedom fighters made our own Southern slaveholders nervous). The Monroe Doctrine was not about stability, but about protecting a new and beneficial instability
from reactionary Europe. We did take an enormous bite of Mexican territory, which Mexico had inherited and could
not manage, but we did not attempt to destroy or to rule Mexico. At the end of our Civil War, we were even prepared
to intervene militarily on Mexico's behalf against European interlopers, had not the "Emperor" Maximilian met a
fitting end at Mexican hands.
It all began to go wrong when we found ourselves with an accidental empire. Future historians, with the clarity allowed
by centuries, may judge the Spanish-American War to have been America's decisive conflict, a quick fight that
changed our nation's destiny and practice fundamentally. Brief, nearly bloodless, and wildly victorious, that war's
importance has always been underestimated. Unlike almost all of America's other wars, it was a war that need not have
been. Because it did happen, we turned outward, abandoning the convent for the streets, and could not go back. With

that war, we became an imperial power, if a benign one, thus denying our heritage as the key anti-imperial power in
history.
Domestically, the nation we have today is the result of our Civil War. Internationally, our fate was shaped by the
Spanish-American War--more than by any of the wars that followed, despite their greater scope and striking results.
Occurring at the peak of unbridled domestic capitalism, the Spanish-American War made of us an extractive power, in
which the earnings of fruit companies became more important than support for freedom and democracy. Our bayonets
served business, not ideals. This pattern of valuing profit above our pride--or even elementary human decency--holds
true in our present relationships with states as diverse as Saudi Arabia and China (during the captivity of a US military
aircrew in the spring of 2001, some American businessmen went to Capitol Hill to make China's case, rather than
rallying to support our service members; our diplomatic blank check written to Saudi Arabia on behalf of our oil
interests has allowed behind-the-scenes Saudi support for terrorists, while Saudi intelligence services stonewall us and
Saudi citizens commit unprecedented acts of violence against the United States).
Despite evidence to the contrary throughout the 20th century, it has remained our conviction that stability abroad is
good for business and, thus, for the United States--yet, the globalization of America's economic reach was enabled
only by the colossal instabilities of collapsing empires. We argued that peace was good for business, no matter the
human cost of an artificial peace imposed with arms, across a century when wars, revolutions, and decade after decade
of instability opened markets to American goods, investors, and ideas. Were the maps of today identical to those of a
century ago, with the same closed imperial systems in place, our present wealth and power would be impossible.
America has always had a genius for picking up the pieces--the problems arise when we insist on putting those pieces
back together exactly as they were before. I know of no significant example in history where an attempt to restore the
status quo ante bellum really worked. The new "old" regime always turns out to be a different beast, despite attempts
to fit it with a worn-out saddle. Neither bribes nor bullets (nor clumsy, corrupting aid) can make the clock run
backward.
Consider another decisive event roughly contemporary to our war with Spain, the Boxer Rebellion in China. Anxious
to prove we were equal to any member of the club of great powers, we joined the punitive expedition to Peking (as it
then was spelled) and fought against an indigenous movement which, despite its grim methods, hoped to free its
country from outrageous foreign exploitation and humiliation. Of course, that was a time when men with yellow skins
were judged by most Americans as incapable of anything but mischief or lassitude, and I do not imagine that we might
have switched sides--after all, our own legation was under siege, along with those of other, far-more-brutal powers.
Still, imagine how much less savage the 20th century might have been in Asia, and how much more peaceable the
world today, had the Boxers won. The weakness upon which the European powers insisted frustrated any hope of
internal development and left China naked in the face of Japanese aggression a generation later. Even during the
greatest struggle in China's history--that against Japanese barbarism--we demonstrated our appetite for an imagined
stability, creating for ourselves an image of Chiang Kai-shek that ignored his venality, callousness, cowardice, and
impotence.
Our support for Chiang prefigured the behavior of the American diplomats of the eruptive 1990s, men and women
who pretended that a functioning government remained wherever a single mid-level bureaucrat had a working phone
in the blazing capital city. Stamp our feet in outrage as we will at Chinese intransigence today, we hardly may claim to
have been China's benefactor in the past. As the 19th century ended and the 20th began, we chose to collude in
defending the existing world order, thereby losing a world of possibilities. Our actions may have been inevitable in the
context of the times, but that does not make them wise.
The Great War began to break up the old imperial system that hindered the expansion of American trade, but we did
our best to defend the old order to spite ourselves. Apart from President Wilson's hand-wringing at Versailles, our
newly acquired appetite for order trumped any concern we had for human freedom and self-determination. And we
paid a rarely acknowledged price for our complicity in propping up the ancien régime one more time. Given our
preference for micro-causation and our snapshot approach to historical analysis, we may have misunderstood the true
cause of the Great Depression. The "irrational exuberance" of the day served as an accelerator, but the historical force
that drove so much of the developed world into the Depression was the attempt by the cartel of Great War victors to
preserve the imperial trading order, with its restricted markets and an inherent stress on the metropolitan production of

every type of industrial good without regard to efficiency. The imperial system, despite a bit of jerry-rigging, no longer
answered the world's economic requirements. A brutally simple economic law is that only the expansion of
possibilities enables the expansion of wealth, but the goal of Europe's waning empires was to restrict possibilities.
Another seeming law is that developed economies cannot exist in equilibrium: When they cease to advance, they
retreat. The old pre-globalization machine could not go forward anymore. The Depression marked the breakdown of a
world economic system that had lingered into decrepitude.
Of note, the nations most immediately affected by the Depression were all trading nations, because those were the
states the international system had failed; the more autarchic the state, the less it suffered in the short term, giving rise
to the illusion that isolated Russia and sequestered Germany provided viable models for the future. We defended a
static world order and ultimately reaped the most destructive war in history (one doesn't need a revisionist bent to
recognize the economic logic that drove the monstrous German and Japanese regimes to attack the tottering imperial
system that excluded them from dependable access to resources). Even our willingness to wink at the rise of Hitler and
Mussolini was symptomatic of a preference for stability above all. Mussolini "made the trains run on time," and Hitler
did seem to get the Weimar Republic under control at last. Did the Great Depression and the Second World War occur
in the forms in which we experienced them simply because America voted, along with the depleted European victors
at the end of the Great War, to stop the clock wherever the clock could not be turned back?
History insists. The thrust of the imperial twilight was toward breaking down antiquated structures, and World War II
did just that. The single great beneficiary was the United States. Yet, we assumed our resounding success was
somehow fragile and provisional; immensely powerful, we exaggerated our weaknesses. The Cold War was the last
gasp of the last old empire, the Soviet incarnation of the Russian domain of the czars, over-extended--fatally--into
eastern and central Europe. And the Cold War deformed American strategic thought and our applied values beyond
recognition. From the amoral defender of Europe's rotten empires, we descended to an immoral propping up of every
soulless dictator who preferred our payments to those offered by Moscow. We utterly rejected our professed values,
consistently struggling against genuine national liberation movements because we saw the hand of Moscow wherever a
poor man reached out for food or asked for dignity. At our worst in the Middle East, we unreservedly supported--or
enthroned--medieval despots who suppressed popular liberalization efforts, thus driving moderate dissidents into the
arms of fanatics. From our diplomatic personnel held hostage in Iran a generation ago, to the 11 September 2001
terrorist attack on the United States, we have suffered for our support of repressive, "stable" regimes that radicalized
their own impoverished citizens. In the interests of stability, we looked the other way while secret police tortured and
shabby armies massacred their own people, from Iran to Guatemala. But the shah always falls.
Would that we could tattoo that on the back of every diplomat's hand: The shah always falls. Our age--roughly the
period from 1898 through the end of the 21st century--is an age of devolution, of breaking down, of the casting off of
old forms of government and territorial organization in favor of the popular will. Certainly, the forces of reaction can
look very strong--deceptively strong--and the temptation is always to back the devil you know (and who allows you to
explore for oil on his territory). But make no mistake--in one essential respect, today's America is on the same side as
the most repressive voices in the Islamic world and the hard, old men in Beijing: We are trying to freeze history in
place. And it cannot be done. In our ill-considered pursuit of stability (a contradiction in terms), we have raised up
devils, from terrorists to dictators, who will not be easily put down.
The Cold War warped our thinking so badly that when the Soviet empire finally collapsed in 1991, we proclaimed a
new world order while thoughtlessly doing our best to preserve the old one. Our diplomats and decisionmakers needed
new thinking at least as badly as did the men in Moscow. Look at our track record over the last decade: It is a litany of
predetermined failures that would be laughable were it not for the human suffering that resulted.

• When our greatest enemy, the Soviet empire, finally came apart, then-Secretary of State James Baker hurriedly tried
to persuade the empire's components to remain together. Blessedly, the newly independent states weren't having any of
that nonsense. When the American effort to keep Humpty-Dumpty up on his wall failed, we nonetheless continued,
unto this day, to support the territorial integrity of a Russian Federation that remains an enfeebled, but cruel empire.
No matter how many Chechens may be slaughtered, we content ourselves with a polite wag of the finger, shrug our
shoulders, then concede that massacre is an internal matter.

• After a stunning battlefield victory against Iraq, we ensured that Iraq would not suffer a "power vacuum," but would
remain a sovereign state within its existing borders--even though Iraq was an unnatural, constructed state, not an
organic one, and the price of its continued existence was the slaughter of Shiites in the south, the continued suffering
of Kurds in the north, and the deprivation of the remainder of Iraq's population to suit the vanity of a criminal dictator.
Infatuated, as usual, by the mirage of a restored status quo ante bellum, we still face the same enemy we did a decade
ago. Another reason for leaving Saddam in place was our fear of offending neighboring Arab monarchs and leaders,
who themselves dread deposition. Our reward has been their discreet approval of the worst terrorists in history (no
Arab or other Islamic state has made a serious effort to interfere with Osama bin Laden or his confederates; on the
contrary, many are quietly gleeful at American suffering, even while professing their "deepest sympathies," and
elements within Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have provided funding or other support for anti-American terrorism).

• In Somalia, we insisted that a collection of incessantly competing tribes was a bona fide state, and we paid for our
willful illusions in blood and embarrassment (note to Washington: lines on a map do not make a functional state).

• In Haiti, our priority has not been popular well-being, but the preservation of a central state apparatus, however
incapable, demeaning, and corrupt.

• In the former Yugoslavia--a miniature empire if ever there was one--the senior Bush Administration then the
Clinton Administration attempted to persuade the constituent parts of an ever-shrinking "state" that it was in their best
interests to remain together, citing our own campus theorists who reasoned ethnic hatred out of existence and insisted
that, all in all, the peoples of Yugoslavia got along just fine. Of course, the specimen populations paid insufficient heed
to our professors and slaughtered each other with enthusiasm. Instead of considering the evidence of ethnic
incompatibility at this point in history as displayed in blood before our eyes, we sent in our troops in the blithe
expectation that corpses might be made to shake hands with one another. Today, we pretend that the Bosnian
Federation is more than a hate-crippled criminal refuge and that Kosovo will someday be a happy component of
Greater Serbia. As of this writing, we are making believe that a band-aid or two will fix whatever might be wrong with
Macedonia. Our quest for stability in the Balkans has led to a false, fragile stability dependent on the presence, for
decades to come, of foreign troops. To our credit, we stopped the killing, though belatedly, but we botched the peace
so badly that our most enduring achievement has been to make the Balkans safe for black-marketeers.
Operation Desert Storm was our only victory of the past decade, and we threw its fruits away. We clutched the false
god Stability to our bosoms, and now we are paying for our idol worship. History (for want of a better word) does
have a godlike force, and we have stood against it. We have devalued our heritage, behaved as hypocrites, and
succored monsters--and there is no sign that we will change our ways. From decomposing Indonesia (the questions are
only of the speed of secession and the cost in blood) to the Arabian peninsula, we refuse to imagine the good that
change might bring.

How did we come to this? In all other spheres, we have been the most creative, imaginative, innovative, and flexible
nation in history. How is it that our diplomats and those who must rely upon them fell in love with the past, when our
national triumphs have resulted from embracing the future?
Unfortunately, it can be easily explained. In times of sudden change, men look to what they know. When, after 1898,
America abruptly found itself a world power with possessions offshore and across the Pacific, our diplomats relied on
the existing model--the European system of collusion and apportionment designed at the Congress of Vienna by Prince
Metternich, manipulated artfully in the next generation by Palmerston and his associates, and perfected, tragically, by
Bismarck, whose genius led him to design a European security system that only a genius could maintain (and
Bismarck's successors were not men of genius). Just on the eve of a new century that would sweep away the old order,
we bought into the European system of mutual protection and guarantees (even defeated countries are not allowed to
disappear; the lives of rulers, however awful their behavior, are sacrosanct; and states do not interfere in the domestic
affairs of other states, etc.).

It was especially easy for our diplomats to accept the "wisdom" of the European way of organizing a strategic regime
because, at that time, our diplomatic corps was dominated by the sons of "good" New England and mid-Atlantic
families whose ties to and affinities toward the Old World were already out of step with those of their less-decorous
and more vigorous countrymen. If the Army belonged to those born in Virginia and south (and west), then the
Department of State belonged to those from Virginia and north, and to the aspirants from elsewhere who emulated our
Anglophiles and Europhiles most sincerely. Today, in 2001, America's diplomatic wisdom is that of Metternich and
Castlereagh, brilliant reactionaries whose intent was to turn back the clock of history, then freeze the hands in place,
after the Napoleonic tumult. America's international successes in the 20th century occurred despite our diplomatic
corps' values and beliefs.
Surely there is a middle way between supporting every failing state (usually a state that deserves to fail) and hunkering
down in a bunker in Kansas while genocide prevails. The greatest immediate difficulty is that any such "middle way"
would, in fact, be a number--perhaps a great number--of different ways. The classical age of diplomacy, from
Metternich through Bismarck to Kissinger, is finished. In truth, a one-size-fits-all diplomatic framework never really
worked, but during the Cold War we expended tremendous efforts to make it function, or at least to pretend it was
working. Today, in a world that is systemically, developmentally, economically, and culturally differentiated and
differentiating--despite the surface effects of globalization--our diplomacy cannot rely on easy-to-use constructs or
unifying ideology (a great triumph of the 20th century was the destruction of the historical aberration of ideology in the
West; today's European "socialists" owe more to trial-and-error than to Marx, LaSalle, or Liebknecht, and all but the
most bigoted Americans are political pragmatists in the clinch).
Our strategic approach must be situational, though shaped in each separate case by our national interests and informed
by our core values. Of course, we must recognize the limits of the possible, but our greatest problem as a global power
seems to be understanding what is impossible abroad, whether the impossibility is creating enduring ethnic harmony in
the Balkans through armed patrols, willing a Somali state into existence through the presence of a few thousand undersupported troops, or trying to control terrorists with blustering threats and the occasional cruise-missile spanking.
The hardest thing is always to think clearly, to slash through the inherited beliefs that no one ever examines and to defy
the wise men who have built careers on exorbitant failures. All people, in every culture, are captive to slogans, but
Americans must strive to do a little better. We have made a slogan of democracy abroad, imagining it as a practical
means when it is, in fact, the glorious end of a long and difficult road. We speak of human rights, then wink at the
mundane evil of Saudi Arabia, the grotesque oppression in China, and any African massacres that don't leak to the
press--because, inside our system of diplomacy, human rights are finally regarded as a soft issue. Yet, sincere and
tenacious support for human rights is always good policy in the long term. The oppressor falls, whether in one year or
50, and it is easier to do business with a nation whose freedom struggle you have supported than with one whose
suffering you ignored or even abetted.
Regarding the business sector, it is the job of Wall Street to maintain short-term vigilance. But Washington must learn
to counterbalance that short-term view with a longer-term perspective. Instead of a revolving door, there should be a
steel wall between Wall Street and Washington. Diplomatic and military concessions to a repressive regime that allows
select US-headquartered corporations economic advantages today may prove a very poor investment for our country's
greater interests tomorrow. We need to think across disciplines, to break the dual stranglehold of diplomatic tradition
and economic immediacy. Were we only to apply our own professed ideals where it is rational and possible to do so,
we would, indeed, find our way to a better, safer world in time. But we must stop trying to arrest the decomposition of
empire's legacy. We are in a period of unprecedented and inevitable global change, and we must learn to accommodate
and to help shape local changes constructively. But we cannot prevent the future from arriving.
Again, there is no unified field theory of diplomacy at our disposal. This is the hardest thing for Washingtonians to
understand. Our responses to the world's dramas must be crafted on a case-by-case basis and founded upon nuanced
knowledge of the specific situation. There is no single framework, and the rules change from continent to continent
and even from week to week. Our national interest, too, evolves. Only our core values--the rule of law, the rights of
the individual, and religious and ethnic tolerance--remain constant.
Democracy is a highly evolved mechanism for maintaining the society we have achieved, but it is not a tool for

creating a society worth maintaining. Without good and respected laws, a commitment to essential human rights, and
the willingness to honor differences of birth and confession, democracy is just a con game for bullies. Democracy as
we know it also may require a certain level of popular affluence. But democracy alone will not bring affluence. Weak,
new governments, or those transforming themselves, need training wheels on the bicycle of state, and we try to insist
instead that every government should jump on a Harley. Far from building trust, democracy may shatter the remaining
social bonds of weak or brutalized societies, dividing survivors into ethnic or religious factions. The over-hasty
imposition of democracy can lead directly to a degeneration in the respect for human rights. Where citizens have not
learned to value their collective interests, democracy intensifies ethnic and religious polarization. Democracy must be
earned and learned. It cannot be decreed from without. In a grim paradox, our insistence on instant democracy in
shattered states (never in strong states or in those with which we do lucrative business, of course) is our greatest
contribution to global instability. We have become strategic doctors determined to prescribe the same cure for every
patient we see, before we have bothered to examine the patient's individual symptoms. Without a thought, we apply the
rules of the Congress of Vienna to Somalia, Bosnia, and the West Bank, then try to graft on democracy overnight. We
might as well attempt to cure cancer by the application of the best medicine of the 18th century.

Let us examine, briefly, just a small selection of the strategic issues facing the United States in which the quest for
stability may prove antithetical to American interests.

• The Balkans represent the worst of all worlds: The slaughters occurred, fatally deepening the local hatreds, before
any of the world's mature governments intervened, and now we are left with artificial states overlapping with de facto
states, each within unsatisfactory boundaries, each with irreconcilable minorities, and each abundantly armed and
criminally funded. "If only" may be pathetic words, but consider what might have been had the Euro-American
community recognized, early on, that Yugoslavia was a Frankenstein's monster of a state that begged to be dismantled.
There would have been no way to satisfy all, but plebiscites under international auspices--on which we had the raw
power to insist--would have saved countless lives and prevented much, if not all, of the misery that benefited only
criminals, bigots, and journalists.

• The Russian Federation gets a pass, no matter how awful or simply contrary its behavior, in the interests of stability.
Having faced down and defeated the magnificently armed Soviet Union, we have talked ourselves into fearing the
weak rump state that survived its ruin. In Washington, a great deal of sanctimonious cant may be heard about the
danger of nuclear weapons falling into criminal hands should Russian stability fail, even though the Soviet regime was
the most powerful criminal organization in history and those left behind are petty thugs by comparison, incapable of
initiating a nuclear war as Moscow suffers through its new "time of troubles." A Russia in which power devolves to
outlying regions or from which territories might secede would be a more promising, amenable Russia than the
slimmed-down autocracy with which we are currently enamored.
Above all, though, we must demand an accountable Russia. In dealing with Moscow, the best policy is one of calm
fearlessness and quiet rigor. We should accept neither lawless behavior nor tyranny in the name of law, when it is
within our power to resist it (in this regard, our power lies primarily in blocking or discouraging grants, loans, or
access to beneficial financial terms). Our support for human rights should be unwavering. Instead of excusing Russia's
misbehaviors, we should deal with Moscow equitably (the one thing we have never tried), rewarding good behavior
and punishing bad behavior--making a wide range of linkages explicit to the Kremlin. Never hand out rewards in
advance in the hope that good behavior will be forthcoming from Moscow. Yes, Russia is suffering through a period of
psychological dislocation that requires patience and understanding, but there is a crucial difference between
understanding and indulgence. We must display the enlightened firmness of a parent dealing with an unruly child:
Russia must never be allowed to throw a tantrum and have its way. Finally, even should Moscow aid us in our fight
against terrorism, that will not give license to the Kremlin to terrorize its own people.

• China's future is unpredictable, whether the analyst sits in Washington or Beijing. One potential course would be a
breakdown of central control and a return to fractious regionalism. Should such a scenario come to pass, our
instinctive reaction would be to support the failing central power against insurgent or secessionist regions in the
interests of stability--especially given the tens of billions of dollars US-based corporations have invested, and continue

to invest, in China. But we must struggle against the short-term view. A fractured, squabbling China would be less
threatening to US strategic interests in the region and might well emerge as a far more advantageous business partner
(or partners). At present, our China policy, which drains American coffers to enrich a minority of American
businesses, is captive to lobbyists and demonstrates no strategic vision beyond that of individual corporations. We pay
China to become stronger and to prolong internal oppression--and if China weakens, we will prop up the vicious
regime that spites us today. The ideal China would be a federalized, populist state, observant of basic human rights,
that was economically open and militarily subdued. We are more likely to back a disciplined, tank-patrolled,
centralized state that is economically restrictive--in the interests of stability. Faced with the slightest possibility of
disorder, we will grunt and digest any number of Tiananmen massacres.

• Africa is slowly and agonizingly struggling to undo the deformations colonial regimes left behind. In the heartrending tragedies of West Africa, where stability was the only Western idol (at least we are true to our monotheist
heritage), we and the Europeans supported hollow men and hollow regimes for so long that the inevitable collapse has
been especially horrific. Yet, even now, we will deal with the devil, if the devil will just promise to stop the massacres
for the weekend. We must rethink our approach to West Africa fundamentally, and recognize our culpability. "States"
such as Sierra Leone and Liberia are now so thoroughly broken that they require international mandates for
reorganization under neo-colonial regimes. Borders should be re-drawn--in other states as well--to reflect tribal and
ethnic differences or harmonies. Elective affinities are welcome, but brotherhood cannot be enforced to suit 19thcentury boundaries. In Africa, separatism is a natural and healthy force, until it is perverted by delay. Much of Africa
has to be reduced from imperial-sized states to elemental building blocks before the construction of healthy
organizational entities (perhaps called "states," but perhaps not) can begin anew on a more natural and hopeful
foundation.
In Central and East Africa, the process has taken a modified form, with African power groupings redrawing boundaries
on their own, despite fervent denials that they are doing any such thing. In this region, outsiders simply need to keep
their hands off, except when the killing threatens to become too egregious. Wherever possible, Africans need to
discover African solutions, with corrective hands applied only when human rights abuses escalate intolerably. (Of
course, it would be best if we could stop all human rights abuses, but we cannot. Regrettably, we must ignore Africa's
misdemeanors and concentrate on the felonies, at least for now.) Any attempts to enforce the old European-designed
borders indefinitely are bound to fail, while exciting ethnic tensions to an even greater degree than wrongheaded
meddling did in the former Yugoslavia.

• The Middle East defies solution. A functional compromise between Israelis and Palestinians was impossible when
the fanatics were merely on one side, and now they compose the decisive elements on both sides. Barring cataclysms,
an Israeli born as this essay is written is likely to wade through his or her entire life in an ebb and flow of conflict.
Meaning well, and behaving foolishly, we plunged into the Arab-Israeli conflict as an "honest broker," although neither
side can accept the compromises required by such brokering, while our baggage as both Israel's primary supporter and
the long-time backer of many of the most reprehensible Arab regimes is a debilitating handicap to mediation. We
declare that stability in the Middle East is critical, no matter if it is impossible without a Carthaginian peace imposed
by one side or the other.
The Israelis and the Palestinians can coexist. They already do. But their coexistence is of a different, dynamic nature
that belies the meaning we attach to the term. Their struggle fulfills both sides. The Palestinians will never be satisfied,
no matter how much they might regain, and the siege mentality Israelis affect to deplore may be essential to the
continued vigor of their state. For both factions, struggle and the self-justification it allows may be the most fulfilling
condition.
Americans assume that violent disorder is an unnatural state that must be resolved, but high levels of violence in a
society or region may simply maintain a different kind of equilibrium than that to which we are accustomed. At the
very least, periods of violence may be lengthy transitions that cannot be artificially foreshortened. We need not
condone violence to recognize that it is not an artificial imposition upon human nature, nor will insisting that violence
is unnatural make it so. We know so little about the complex origins of violence that our beliefs about it are no more
than superstitions. Whether in regard to the violence of the man or the mass, our theories attempt to explain it away

rather than to understand it. The Middle East may be inhumane, but it is one of the most explicitly human places on
earth.
And would a peaceful resolution of the Middle East confrontation benefit the United States, after all? Hard-core
terrorists would not cease and desist--no peace could ever satisfy them. And wouldn't we lose critical leverage? Israel,
no longer dependent upon the United States as its ultimate defender, might prove a worrisome maverick. The Arab
world might come to rely even more heavily upon the United States, but that would be one of history's great booby
prizes.
Nor do the repressive, borrowed-time Arab governments in the region really want to see a successful, independent
Palestinian state. The Palestinian struggle is a wonderful diversion for deprived Islamic populations elsewhere, but
none of the Arab elites truthfully likes or trusts the Palestinians, who, if they achieved a viable, populist state of their
own, would provide an unsettling example to the subjects of neighboring regimes. Arab rulers regard the Palestinians
as too unpredictable, too obstreperous, too secular, too vigorous, and much too creative (resembling the Israelis, in
fact). As it is, the rest of the Arab world is happy to fight to the last Palestinian, insisting the Palestinians maintain
demands unacceptable to Israel. The struggle will go on for a long time to come. The best the United States can do at
present is to inhibit the most excessive violations of human rights, while placing responsibility for the conflict on the
shoulders of the participants, not on our own. We also must avoid absurd knee-jerk reactions, such as condemning
legitimate efforts by Israel to strike guilty individuals, which is a far more humane and incisive policy than Palestinian
suicide-bomber attacks on discos and restaurants.
By exciting false hopes of an ill-defined peace, we only inflame passions we cannot quench. Again, we have gotten
into the habit of speaking loudly and laying our stick aside. We would do better with fewer press releases and more
behind-the-scenes firmness--when engagement is to our advantage. And the occasional show of overwhelming force in
the region works wonders.

• Islamic terrorism merits separate discussion now. It is not the result of creative instability, but of the atrophy of a
civilization exacerbated by generations of Western support for an artificial stability in the Arab and Islamic world.
While most Islamic terrorism is culturally reactionary, another aspect of it is an impulse for change perverted by
hopelessness. And terrorism is, finally, a brutal annoyance, but not a threat to America's survival, despite the grim
events of 11 September. Osama bin Laden and his ilk may kill thousands of Americans through flamboyant terrorist
acts, but their deeds reflect tormented desperation and fear, not confidence or any positive capability. Terrorists may
be able to destroy, but they cannot build, either a skyscraper or a successful state. Destruction is the only thing of
which they remain capable, and destruction is their true god. These men seek annihilation, not only ours, but their
own. No entrances are left open to them, only the possibility of a dramatic exit. They are failed men from failed states
in a failing civilization. Claiming to represent the oppressed (but enraged by the "liberal" behavior of most
Palestinians), fundamentalist terrorists of so hardened a temper would not be contented, but only further inflamed, by
any peace settlement that did not inaugurate their version of the Kingdom of God on earth. They are not fighting for a
just peace, but for their peace--and even if they attained that peace, they would desire another. They are, in every
sense, lost souls, the irredeemable. Their savagery is not a result of the failure of any peace process, but a reaction to
their own personal failures and to the failures of their entire way of life.
These lines are written on the 13th day of September 2001, two days after the most horrendous terrorist attack in
history, and America is seized by a just fury in which even the worst effects of local disasters are exaggerated. But
before this essay goes to press, Americans will realize that their lives remain gloriously normal, even as the media
delights in hysteria. Despite the thousands of personal tragedies and the practical disruptions that resulted from the
seizure of commercial aircraft and the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the astonishing thing is
how little permanent effect the terrorists will have had on daily life in the United States. There will be a scar, but the
long-term effects of this grotesque tragedy will ultimately strengthen America. It has reminded us of who we are, and
now we are rolling up our sleeves for the task ahead.
Without in any way belittling the tragedy, the fact is that the United States will emerge stronger and more united, with
a sobered sense of strategic reality that will serve us well in the decades to come. In the long term, the terrorist
immolations in New York, at the Pentagon, and in the Pennsylvania hills will prove to be counterproductive to the

terrorists' cause, context, and ambitions. We are a phenomenally strong and resilient nation, while the societies that
spawned our enemies are decaying and capable only of lashing out at the innocent.

• Afghanistan. If any conflict of the last three decades requires a revised assessment, it is the Soviet engagement in
Afghanistan. Blinded by the brinksmanship and the reflexive opposition of the Cold War era, we failed to see that the
Russians, in this peculiar instance, were the forces of civilization and progress. I do not defend their tactical behavior,
but they did attempt to sustain a relatively enlightened, secular regime against backward, viciously cruel religious
extremists--whom we supported, only to reap a monstrous harvest. Our backing of the most socially repressive
elements within the Afghan resistance (because they were the "most effective") backfired beyond all calculation.
Incredibly, blinded again by the seeming verities of the Cold War, we trusted the advice of Pakistan's Inter-Service
Intelligence Agency (ISI), an inherently anti-Western organization that has since supported both the Taliban and
Osama bin Laden, as well lesser terrorists, providing them weapons, funds, safe havens, and free passage to the rest of
the world.
Afghanistan, as we realize all too well in the autumn of 2001, has become the terrorist haven of the world, and we
helped to make it so. We were determined that communism would not be allowed to destabilize the region. Now, in
one of the bitter returns of history, our military forces in the skies over Afghanistan may face American-made and
American-provided surface-to-air missiles. Our folly in Afghanistan should be final proof of the falsity of the dictum
that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." Sometimes, the enemy of your enemy is just practicing for the big game.

• Cuba may be a small problem in the geostrategic sense, but it certainly fixes America's attention. The instability
likely to embarrass us in Cuba will come after Castro's disappearance, as the island's current regime weakens and
dissolves. The Batista-Cubans we have harbored in South Florida, whose political influence has maintained one of the
most counterproductive of American policies, will try to reclaim, purchase, and bribe their way into power in the land
they or their elders exploited then fled. The Cubans who stayed in Cuba, for better and worse, do not want their rich
relatives back. And were we to be the least bit just, we would recognize that those who stayed behind have earned the
right to decide how their island will be governed in the future. For all our ranting about the Castro dictatorship--which
may not be admirable, but which is far more liberal and equitable than many of America's client governments (tourists
clamor to go to Havana, not Riyadh)--an honest appraisal reveals that the average Cuban, though impoverished by the
policies both of his own government and of the United States, enjoys a better quality of life than that of the average
resident of many a "free" Caribbean state. If we intervene at some future date to protect the "rights" and the "legitimate
property" of the Miami Cubans at the expense of the Cuban people themselves, we will shame ourselves inexcusably.
Post-Castro Cuba, on its own, has an unusually good chance of evolving into a model democracy, but it will not do so
if we sanction and support the carpetbagging of emigres who have never found American democracy fully to their
tastes.

• Indonesia is the ultimate illogical state. Spread over thousands of islands and forcing together ethnically, culturally,
and religiously different populations, this mini-empire almost certainly will continue to fragment, no matter the
contours and composition of the Jakarta government. Inevitably, we will try to arrest the state's decomposition (as of
this writing, we are rushing to renew our support of Indonesia's corrupt, abusive military). Just as inevitably, we will
fail. If we and other interested states are not thinking about how to manage and facilitate Indonesia's breakup, we will
find ourselves embarrassed by history again. Supporting what is essentially an ethnically based colonial regime against
the will of powerful minorities on the periphery is bound to fail, first morally, then practically.
Devolution threatens a great range of other states, from Pakistan to Italy. The problems of each will be unique. But the
common thread will be that attempts to arrest instability and to prolong the life of decayed, unnatural states, rather than
to assist populations through longed-for political reorganizations, will always carry an exorbitant price and, ultimately,
will fail.

At present, a portion of the armed forces of the United States is mired in stability operations that simply bide time in
the hope that somehow things will come out right, while an even greater portion is focused on avenging the recent
terrorist attacks against America. We may wish all of these endeavors Godspeed, yet it would be a disservice to the

men and women in uniform not to ask how we have come to this pass. Self-examination in the strategic sphere has not
been an American strength. Perhaps it is time to make it one.
Meanwhile, we deny causes, ignore unpleasant realities, put on our flak jackets, and hope for the best. Certainly we
should not replace stability operations with "instability operations" to provoke or accelerate change beyond its local,
organic pace. And we must differentiate between unpopular terrorist groups and genuine mass movements: There is a
great difference between the vicious Basque terrorists of the ETA and the African National Congress that triumphed
over apartheid. All dissident organizations are not equally legitimate.
But we do need to stop providing life-support to terminally ill governments, and we must be open to new,
unprecedented solutions, from plebiscites that alter borders to emergent or re-emergent forms of administration in
failed states, whether enlightened corporate imperialism or post-modern tribalism. If the corporation can manage more
humanely than the dictator, why not give it a chance? If the tribe can govern more effectively than a thieving,
oppressive government, why not let the tribe reclaim its own land?
Of late, we have heard all too much about the United States being the world's policeman. We are not, we cannot afford
to be, and we couldn't bring it off if we tried--not least because policemen have to be on the beat everywhere, around
the clock, and their most successful work is preventive (a concept that democracies, which are reactive in foreign
policy, find anathema). Apart from our new and essential crusade against terrorism, which must pursue preemptive
measures, our role should be that of a global referee, calling time out when the players hit below the belt or get too
rough, and clarifying the rules of the game (no genocide, no ethnic cleansing, no mass rape, no torture, etc.). Instead of
trying to stop the game, which was our approach across the past decade, we should try to facilitate it when it is played
by legitimate players for legitimate stakes. In the case of terrorists, of course, we need to throw them out of the game
permanently.
But what on earth is wrong with people wanting their freedom? Why shouldn't populations want the armed forces of a
central government that is essentially an occupying power to leave their territory? Why are yesterday's borders more
important than today's lives? Why should we support religiously-intolerant regimes that virtually enslave women and
persecute nonbelievers to death? How much mass suffering is it worth to keep things geostrategically tidy? How dare
we send our soldiers to support bigoted monarchies that forbid our troops to worship as they choose? How stable can
any government be that fears a Christmas tree? Why should we pretend that every war criminal is really a democrat
waiting for his opportunity to vote? Why should we reflexively support the rich and powerful against the poor they
abuse and exploit? Why must we insist that history can be made to run backward?
A new century demands new ideas. The notion that stability is the fundamental strategic virtue is not going to be one
of them.
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